In their opening game against Saudi Arabia, Argentina's pressing up front was ineffective, largely due to Messi's limited mobility. This caused their midfield third to become overwhelmed and outnumbered. In possession, Saudi Arabia played with a formation that was heavily lopsided to their right. As a result, much of Argentina's pressing occurred on that side—and closer to their own defensive third.
Against Mexico, Argentina made a personnel change and had Messi play deeper to improve midfield stability, focusing on cutting off passing lanes in that area of the pitch.
In the match against Poland, Argentina used an aggressive 4-3-3 formation to win possession higher up the pitch, closer to Poland's defensive third. This pressure often forced the Polish goalkeeper to clear the ball long under pressure, attempting to bypass Argentina's intensity. As a result, Poland had less possession and posed little threat when they did have the ball.
The Round of 16 match against Australia was similar to the one against Poland, except the Australians were more passive. Argentina, on the other hand, pressed even more aggressively than they had in their previous game.
The quarter-final against the Netherlands showcased Argentina's ability to adapt their pressing to counter a strong, possession-based opponent. They kept the central areas compact and forced the Dutch out wide, where their one-on-one play proved ineffective.
Croatia had a strong ball-playing midfield, but knowing they posed little threat in attack, Argentina were willing to sacrifice possession in the semifinal. Instead, they picked their moments to press, capitalized on defensive errors, and transitioned quickly into attack—taking their chances well and scoring three goals.
In the final against France, Argentina aggressively exploited their opponent's weakness by overloading the left-hand side during a dominant first half. They also improved their midfield pressing in extra time, allowing them to hold on for a draw and take the match to a penalty shoot-out.